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These case studies were developed in order to help Bank task team leaders and their client
country counterparts design and support effective microfinance  components within social
funds.  The case studies aim to highlight best practice as well challenges  for designing and
implementing  a microfinance component within a multisectoral project.  Based on lessons
learned from these case studies, a set of guidelines  were developed  and is available from the
Social Protection Advisory Service or the Social Funds website.Table of Contents
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Objective
As  microfinance  has  become  recognized  as  a  valuable  tool  for  increasing  the
livelihoods  and  reducing  the vulnerability ol  the poor,  many  World  Bank  task managers  and
project  planners have  become  eager to  include  microfinance  components  in social  funds and
other multisectoral  projects.  As a result, there has been  a growing  demand for information  on
successful approaches  to project design arkd implementation.
In  response  to  this  demand,  the  Social  Fund  Thematic  Group  has  initiated  several
activities  to support task  managers  in their work.  The  first of these  activities  is this series of
case  studies  that  reviews  social  fund  projects  with  microfinance  components.  The  case
studies,  which  focus  on  Panama,  Yemen,  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  Eritrea,
explore  a  wide  range  of  implementation  experiences-both  successes  and  failures.  The
objective  is to  identify  lessons,  best practices,  and  potential  pitfalls.  The  next  step will be  to
develop  practical  guidelines  for task managers  on  how to encourage  and replicate  successful
approaches.
Social  funds  are  demand-driven  mechanisms  that  channel  resources  to  the poor  and
support  subprojects  that respond  directly  to  the  priority  needs  of the  poor.  They  have  been
used  in  a  growing  number  of countries  to  alleviate  the  social  and  economic  effects  of
economic  crises,  cushion  the  impact  of  adjustment  programs,  generate  short-term
employment,  and  finance  small-scale  investments  in  poor  communities.  Since  1987,  the
World Bank has supported more than  60 social  fund programs.
The Social  Fund/Microfinance  Debate
Despite the  attractiveness of microfinance  as a tool  for poverty  reduction,  combining
social  funds-which  typically  provide  grants  to  community  groups,  nongovernmental
organizations  (NGOs),  and  local  governmenits  for community  development  initiatives-and
microfinance  is  a  complex  and  even  controversial  undertaking.  As  these  case  studies
illustrate,  social  funds are accompanied  by a set of constraints that, if not addressed  explicitly
at the outset, can  make adhering  to microfinance  best practices  difficult  or impossible.  Such
constraints  vary  widely,  but  commonly  include  organizational  structures  that  emphasizegrants  or infrastructure  subprojects.  budget systems that do not permit rigorous  monitoring of
microfinance  institutions  (MFIs),  and  staff incentives  that  focus  on  disbursement  of funds
rather  than  sustainability  of  MFIs.  Experience  has  shown,  however,  that  if  a  project  is
designed  properly  and  supported  with  adequate  technical  assistance  from  the  outset,
microfinance components  within social funds can not only respond to a community's  demand
for financial services,  but also provide the nucleus of a country's microfinance  industry.
Several  options  exist  for  designing  projects  to  support  microfinance.  For  example,
microfinance  can  be part  of a financial  sector  investment  loan  which  has  the  advantage  of
introducing  general  policy  and  regulatory  framework  reforms.  However,  most  financial
sector  operations  are  aimed  at  the  formal  financial  sector  and  larger  commercial  banks  in
particular.  While  this  is  changing,  few  address  the  microfinance  niche.  Freestanding
microfinance  projects  that  focus exclusively  on microfinance  are also  rare.  As  a  result,  and
because they are more  directly linked  with community-based  demand,  social funds and other
multisectoral  community-level  programs  have  been  asked  to support  microfinance  activities
as a way of improving incomes and encouraging productive endeavors  at the local level.
This  study does not seek  to answer  the broad  question  of whether  social  funds are  or
are  not  suitable  vehicles  for  microfinance.  That  would  be  well  beyond  the  scope  of this
review.  Rather,  it  takes  the  approach  that,  given  that  social  fund  projects  do  offer
microfinance  services, what have been the results? What has worked,  what has not, and why?
The goal  is to  identify  lessons and  best practices  from  the field,  as well  as specific obstacles
related to implementation that program staff encountered  along the way.
New Generation of Social  Funds
These  case  studies  focus  on  a  "new  generation"  of social  funds  with  microfinance
components  that  have  been  designed  and  implemented  primarily  since  1995.  It  was  at  that
time  that  a  World  Bank  portfolio  review  found  that,  though  a  small  number of social  fund
programs  displayed  positive  results,  the  portfolio  overall  did  not  generally  reflect  best
practices  as  characterized  by  successful  microfinance  programs  worldwide.'  Performance
was  satisfactory  in  terms  of targeting,  but  microfinance  programs  generally  failed  to  pay
' Portfolio Improvement  Programi-A  Review of Social Fund Microfinance Components.  World  Bank,
Financial Sector Development  Department.  October  1996.adequate  attention  to  the  institutional  development  and  sustainability  of  their  partner
financial  institutions.  This  largely  reflects  the  emergency  focus  of the  first  generation  of
social  funds.  Government  policy  was  oriented  more  toward  creating  employment  and
improving  income  in response  to  a crisis than toward  longer-term  objectives.  As such, social
fund  activities  were  not geared  toward  strengthening  or reforming  the  microfinance  sector,
but  rather  toward  using  existing  microfinance  programs  as  channels  for  expanding
employment.
This  new  generation  of  projects  also  benefited  from  developments  in  the
microfinance  industry.  In  1995,  the  microfinance  industry  went  through  a  major  transition
when  the  donor  community  achieved  consensus  on  the  broad  strategies  for  the  sector  and
issued Micro and Small Enterprise Finance: Guiding Principles  for Selecting and Supporting
Intermediaries. The  principles  hiave  influenced  the  sector  dramatically  and  point  to  the
critical  importance of capacity building  for MFIs.
This  study  suggests that  the response of social  funds to these industry  developments,
findings,  and recommendations  has been positive.  What has emerged  from the case studies  is
a  picture  of  a  new  generation  of social  fund  projects  that  incorporate  microfinance  best
practices  to a greater  degree  than  in the past,  in  keeping with their evolution  toward  longer-
term  objectives.  Several  of  the  most  successful  projects  have  shifted  their  focus  from
reaching disbursement  targets to achieving institutional  and financial sustainability of MFIs.
The  studies  show  that  many  projects  have  adopted  a  "phasing  approach"  to
institutional  development,  in which  the  microfinance  program  is anchored  within  the  social
fund  only  on  an  interim  basis.  During  the  first  phase,  the  project  develops  and  tests  its
methodology  and trains  a core  group  of staff members.  During  the second  phase,  it  expands
in size and scope,  develops new products,  and builds staff capacity.  During the third phase, it
reaches  institutional  and  financial  sustainability  and  is  "spun  off'  from  the  social  fund  or
removed  from government  control.
The  case  studies explore  a broad range of implementation  experiences.  Main  lessons
are outlined  below.
*  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  The  Bosnia  case  illustrates  how  a  "stand-alone"
microfinance  project  can be  designed within  a  social  fund  and  incorporate  many
of the industry best practices.
3*  Albania:  The Albania case  illustrates  how the "phasing  approach"  to institutional
development  works.  It demonstrates  how  a very  small  pilot  project  within  the
social  fund can serve  as the basis of a country's microfinance  industry and  lead to
a  private,  self-sustaining  MFI.  While  the  Albanian  Development  Fund  provided
the  institutional  backing,  space,  and  flexibility  to pilot microfinance,  in the long-
term  the  institutional  environment  was  not  conducive  to  fiscal  discipline  or
sustainability.
*  Panama: An  examination of the experience  in Panama confirms that social funds
can  be  risky vehicles  for  microfinance  if they do  not contain  adequate  measures
for  institution  building  at the  outset.  As  originally  planned,  the  project  did  not
take  an  industry-wide  view  nor  focus  on  the  institutional  development
requirements  of the  partner  organizations  and,  as  a  result,  faced  numerous  and
complex  challenges  in redesign.
*  Yemen:  The  Yemen  Social  Fund  for  Development  is  the  first  microfinance
program  in  the  region  to  develop  a  lending  methodology  based  on  Islamic
banking practices.  While the main  challenge  of the  first phase  of the project  was
to  establish  MFIs  where  none  existed,  the  challenge  of the  second  phase  is  to
build the capacity of those  institutions to provide  services on a sustainable  basis.
*  Eritrea: The  case of Eritrea  shows how a  social  fund can  operate a microfinance
program  in  a  post-conflict  environment.  It  is  a  case  in  which,  given  the  lack  of
feasible  alternatives  or  existence  of appropriate  partner  institutions,  the  social
fund  engages  in  direct finance,  but does so  only as  a first step toward  developing
sustainable  financial institutions.
Methodology
The  case  studies are  based  on desk  reviews  of relevant  literature,  project  documents,
and  operational  manuals,  as  well  as  on  interviews  with  task  team  leaders  and  project  staff.
The  studies  have  been  conducted  in  collaboration  with  the  Bank's  Social  Fund  Thematic
Group,  Rural  and  Small  Enterprise  Thematic  Group,  CGAP,  and  the  Financial  Sector
Development (FSD)  Department.
411.  Case Study: Bosnia  and Herzegovina
Name of project  - Local  Initiatives Project
Date of appraisal  November  19,  1996
Main components  a) Microcredit  Programs,  b) Microfinance
Capacity Building,  c) Project Management
Total project cost  $US 18.0 million
Bank loan amount  $US7.0 million
Microfinance  component  as  100 percent
percentage  of Bank loan  _-
Introduction
The  LQcal  Initiatives  (Microfinance)  Project  (LIP)  was  designed  in  the  immediate
post-conflict  context of Bosnia and  Herzegovina  under the overall  framework  of the  Priority
Reconstruction  and  Economic  Recovery  Program.2 Combined  with other investments  (public
works,  employment  counseling,  and  retraining)  the  project  aimed  at  assisting  people  in
making the  transition  away  from  unemployment  and dependence  on humanitarian  assistance
to active employment and income generation.
Objectives
The  project  was  the  first  major  investment  in  microfinance  in  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina.  Although  there  was  a tradition  of savings  and  credit associations,  particularly
within state-owned  companies,  there  were  no microcredit  services  available  for  low-income
entrepreneurs  at  project  start.  The  overall  aim  of the project  was  to jumpstart the 5-  to  10-
year process of establishing  a strong micro  finance sector so  as to help raise  incomes,  create
jobs,  and  devefop  the  smallest  businesses.  This  was  to  be  done  by  contracting  selected
organizations  that met specified eligibility  criteria and providing them with the  financial  and
technical support and incentives to develop into high-performing  microfinance operations.
Specifically, the project had three  objectives:
*  To provide  access  to credit  to the  economically  disadvantaged  and  war-affected,
specifically  low-income  microentrepreneurs  who had  no access to credit  from the
2 This case study is an adaptation of the presentation written  by  Sarah  Forster  in January 2001,  at the Social
Fund Thematic  Group's series on social  funds with  microfinance components.
5commercial  banking  sector.  A  performance  target  of up  to  10,000  loans  were  to
be disbursed.
*  To facilitate  the  development  of independent,  financially  viable  MFIs that  would
continue to provide  credit to low-income entrepreneurs  over the long-term.
*  To  create  an  appropriate  legal  and  regulatory  environment  for  the  provision  of
credit  and savings services to  low-income entrepreneurs.
Institutional Arrangements
The  project  is  a  stand-alone  microfinance  project,  implemented  by  two  specialized
agencies-the  Local  Initiatives  Departments-within  two  government-created,  autonomous
foundations.  These  foundations  also  implement  three  other  projects,  including  the  Public
Works and  Employment  Project,  which  is based  on a social  fund  model  and offers  demand-
driven, small-scale  investments  for communities.
The Local  Initiatives  Departments acted as apex  institutions with three main roles:
*  To  channel  loan  fund  and  operating  cost  support  to  selected  microcredit
organizations  under performance-based  contracts.
*  To  organize  capacity-building  support  to  develop  partner  institutions  as
sustainable MFIs.
*  To monitor the institutional and financial  performance of the partner institutions.
Implementation  Experience
The  project vastly exceeded  its original  objectives.  As of October 31, 2000, a  total of
61,975  loans  had  been  disbursed  for  a  total  value  of $US83  million-equivalent,  with  an
average  loan size disbursed of $US 1,450. Repayment  rates are extremely  high, with less than
I percent of the outstanding portfolio at risk.
Post-conflict Impact
For  many  borrowers,  the  provision  of  credit  targeted  toward  people  such  as
themselves,  without  assets  or  big  businesses,  has  had  a  positive  psychological  impact,
particularly  important in the post-conflict  environment.
Seventy-nine  (79)  percent  of the  borrowers  consider  that the  loan  has  significantly
improved  their economic  situation,  with  increases  in  monthly  household  income  averaging
26  percent.  Thirty  (30)  percent  of businesses  stated  that  they  were  able  to  employ  one  or
6more additional  people  after  loan  disbursement.  Forty-nine  (49) percent of the borrowers  are
women,  many of them widowed during the war.
Performance Assessments  of MFIs
The  LIP  originally  provided  financing  to  17  selected  NGOs.  An  institutional  and
performance  assessment  resulted  in  withdrawing  loan  funds  from  eight  organizations  and
continuing  to  finance  only  nine  (six  local  and  three  international  NGOs).  The  eight
organizations  ended  up  merging  with those  that had continued  access  to  financing,  resulting
in a welcome  consolidation within the microfinance  sector.
As  of June  30,  2001,  these  nine  MFIs  were  serving  a  total of 25,000  active  clients
(between  1,000  and  4,000  clients  each)  with  outstanding  loans  worth  a  total  of  $US25
million.  All  nine  MFIs  are  operationally  sustainable  after  less  than  four  years  of operation
(that is, they are able to cover all their operaling costs from the operating income).
Developing  a Legal Framework
The process of developing  an appropriate  legal  framework  for MFIs is well advanced.
A  legal  and  regulatory  framework  was  developed  by  a  working  group  composed  of
Ministries  of Finance,  the  Banking  Agency,  MFIs,  the  World  Bank,  and  USAID.  This
framework  proposes the creation of four categories  of financial  institutions based on services
provided  and  public  risk.  The  first  step of developing  and  passing  a  Law  on  Microcredit
Organizations-such  that  existing  credit-only,  non-profit  MFIs  could  register  and  operate
legally-has been  achieved.
Financial  Sustainability
Partner MFIs received  grant support for their start-up fixed and operating costs  for the
first  three  years  of operations.  This  support  declined  from  100  percent of operating  costs in
year one to 50 percent in year two and to 0 percent in year three.
Operational  cost support, referred to as "management  fees,"  totaled  $US 4 million, or
18.4  percent  of total  financing.  The  nine  MFIs  currently  financed  received  an  average  of
$US320,000  each in operating  subsidy.  Today, all MFIs cover their own operating  costs from
their  own  operating  income  and  are  not  dependent  on  injections  of  outside  funding  to
continue  running.
7Second  Local  Initiatives Project
The success of the  LIP  has  led  to the development  of a second microfinance  project,
also funded  by the  World  Bank  and  other donors.  The Second  Local  Initiatives  Project (LIP
11)  is  designed  to  build  on1  the  achievements  of  LIP  I  and  increase  the  scale,  financial
viability,  and  social  impact  of microfinance  services  in  BH.  LIP  1I  will  continue  to  foster
entrepreneurship  and promote active employment  by providing  access to financial  services  to
low-income  entrepreneurs  who currently  have limited access to services from the commercial
banking  sector.  It  will  also  support  the  development  of  new  products  and  services  and
encourage  a greater focus on the needs of low-income clients to broaden and deepen financial
service  delivery to the poor.
The  project  will  continue  to  take  a  strategic  approach  of  developing  a  strong
sustainable  microfinance  industry at  a nationwide level.  The LIP 11  has two main  differences
from its predecessor project:
*  LIP  11  is  explicitly  designed  to  ease  transition  of the  microfinance  sector  from
dependence  on World  Bank and  donor financing toward  more sustainable  sources
of financing.  Donor grants and concessional  funds are limited and  not dependable
in  the  long-term.  There  is  a pressing  need  for  MFIs  to be  able  legally  to  access
commercial  sources of debt and equity.  For some, this includes legally being able
to collect savings.  LIP  11  will focus on further developing the  legal and regulatory
framework for microfinance  such that MFIs can expand their sources of capital.
*  LIP  11  will  encourage  MFIs  to pay  more attention  to client-level  information  for
understanding  program  impacts  and  developing  new  products  and  services.  The
aim  is  to  support  the  shift  from  a  product-oriented  approach  (focused  on
developing  new  types of financial  products  such as  term  loans,  leasing, savings)
to a more client-centered  approach (focused  on the income  impact on clients)  This
aims to achieve a good balance  between social  and financial outcomes.
Lessons  Learned
NGOs  as Implementing Partners
The decision to  implement  the project by contracting  NGOs. proved to  be appropriate
in  the  particular  context  of post-conflict  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Although  other  legal
entities (commercial  banks,  private agencies)  were also eligible  to apply and  participate  in  a
competitive  selection  process,  NGOs  demonstrated  a  better  understanding  of the  needs  of
target borrowers and had other comparative advantages  (outreach, reputation in communities,
8commitment  to  microcredit.  and  so  forth).  However,  financial  and  business  skills  and
management  capacity  vary  across  the  NGOs.  Ultimately,  those  NGO  microcredit
organizations  that have  the  best  possibility of surviving  long-term  are those  that  combine  a
clear client-driven  vision and strategic goals with strong business management  capacity.
Institutional  Approach
The  first  project  objective  of  disbursing  7,000-10,000  loans  to  low-income
entrepreneurs  was  met  after  only  18  months  of project  implementation.  However,  it  was
agreed  that  this  result  would  not  have  a  significant  impact  if  it  was  not  linked  to  the
development  of institutions that would be able to provide  these services  over the longer-term
and  on  a  sustainable  basis.  Therefore,  particularly  during  the  second  half of the  project,
increased  investments  were made for technical  assistance  (TA) and training to strengthen  the
capacity  of partner  MFIs  in  all  aspects  of  microcredit  operations.  Well-tailored  technical
assistance  also  contributed to  highly satisfactory  performance  of partner organizations,  all of
which have reached operational  sustainability.
The TA strategy was to  use short-term  consultants at the outset rather than long-term
advisors.  By  1999, partner MFIs were  increasingly  able to identify their own technical  needs,
and  the  TA  became  more  demand-driven  to  address  both  common  and  specific  areas  of
interest  for  MFI  operations.  MFIs  also  paid  a  portion  of  the  TA  costs.  In  addition  to
individual  training  to MFIs,  the  project organized  training  courses  on topics  such  as lending
methodologies,  portfolio management,  loan officer training, and financial  management.
Performance-Based  Financing
Project  financing was provided based on the performance of each partner MFI against
mutually  agreed-upon  performance  standards  related  to  institutional  and  financial
performance.  Furthermore,  project  financing  was tailored  "as  if"  MFIs were borrowing  from
commercial  sources  (with  cost  of  capital  of  3-5  percent  per  annum),  and  reporting
requirements  were  established  similar  to those of other  financial  institutions.  This approach
provided  incentives  to  MFIs  to  strengthen  their  institutional  and  financial  performance  to
meet the standards and develop  appropriate  internal  policies and procedures  that have helped
them maintain  impressively  high-quality  portfolios.
9Consultative  Approach
All  the  key policy decisions  related  to  the  Local  Initiatives  Project  were  made  after
consultations  with all  stakeholders  (governments,  MFIs,  banks,  donors,  and  so  forth),  which
resulted  in  better  understanding of the  principles  of microfinance.  Consequently,  MFIs  were
given  an  opportunity  to  work  in  an  environment  that  was  supportive  despite  the  initial
skepticism  of government  officials  about  the concept  of microcredit  and loans  disbursed  by
NGOs.
1011I.  Case Study: Albania
Name of project  Microcredit  Project
Date of appraisal  May 28,  1999
Main components  a) Rural  Credit and Savings Association  Network,
b) Urban Microcredit,  c)  Legal and Regulatory
Environment, d) Project Management
Total project cost  $US22.8 million
Bank loan amount  $11S12 million
Microfinance  component amount of  $US I 1.2 million
bank loan  _
Microfinance  component  as  93 percent
percentage of bank loan
Predecessor  projects  a)  Rural Poverty Alleviation Pilot Project (1993)
b) Rural  Development Project (1995)
c) Urban Works and Microenterprise  Pilot Project
(1995)
Introduction
In  the  early  1990s,  Albania  faced  a serious  economic  crisis.  Having just  emerged
from more than four decades of communism,  it was the poorest country in Europe and only a
fledgling democracy.  In  response to this crisis,  in  1993  the government  of Albania launched
the Rural Poverty  Alleviation  Pilot Project, to be implemented  by the newlycreated  Albanian
Development  Fund  (ADF).  While  the  project  focused  on  infrastructure  rehabilitation,  it
included a small microfinance  component.
Since that time, microfinance  in Albania has evolved  dramatically.  In 1995,  the ADF
expanded  its microfinance  program  under two  subsequent  World  Bank-financed  projects.  In
1999,  the  microfinance  program  was  spun off into a stand-alone  project  that  focuses  on the
development of private self-sustaining  microcredit institutions.  Albania is the only country to
date where the microfinance  component  of a social fund has made this institutional transition.
How did this transition take place,  and what challenges did the project face along the path of
reform?
The experience  shows that while  the ADF  provided  the institutional  backing,  space,
and flexibility  to pilot microfinance.  the institutional  environment was not conducive to fiscal
I Idiscipline  or  sustainability.  It also  demonstrates  that  even  a  very  small  microfinance  pilot
project within a social  fund can provide the nucleus of a country's microfinance  industry.
Institutional Arrangements
The  ADF  is  an  autonomous  government  agency  responsible  for  both  infrastructure
and  credit  activities.  It  is  organized  into  six  different  departments:  Infrastructure  Works;
Rural  Credit;  Microenterprise  Support  &  Rural  Activities;  Urban  Credit;  Monitoring,
Evaluation  and  Studies;  and Finance  and  Administration.  Policies  and objectives  are defined
and overseen  by a Board  of Trustees  (made up of government representatives)  in conjunction
with the various donors, primarily  the World Bank.  Overall management  is performed by the
Executive  Director, a government appointee.
Project  planners  anchored  the  microfinance  program  within  the  ADF  primarily
because  it  lacked  alternatives.  A stand-alone  microfinance  project  was  not  feasible  in  1993
for  several  reasons.  First,  45  years  of isolation  and  collective  production  had  left  most
Albanians without  the skills  and know-how  required  to engage  in market activities." Second,
the  country had  no experience  with  microfinance,  and  therefore  did  not have  an established
lending methodology  to build on. Third, there were no existing institutions or NGOs  with the
capacity  to  manage  a  microfinance  program.  Finally,  the  commercial  banking  system  was
non-existent.  The  Albanian state bank-the country's only functioning financial  institution-
was plagued  by corruption  and  non-performing  portfolios.
Implementation  Experience
Plhase 1 (1993-1995): Piloting
Under  the  Rural  Poverty  Alleviation  Pilot  Project,  the  ADF  focused  on  piloting  its
credit  methodology  for  its  microfinance  program.  Because  the  ADF's  microfinance
component  was small in relation  to other components,  it received very little attention  when  it
began.  Both the government  and  the Bank  concentrated  on the infrastructure  side.  The result
was a rare and valuable  opportunity for innovation:  The project enjoyed  relative  freedom and
valuable flexibility to test and develop its approaches.
Case  Studies in Microfinance,  Legerwood.  Joanna,  May  1999, p. 7.
12The  decision  to  focus  on  the  credit  methodology  at  the  outset  was  critical  to  the
project's success  in the  later phases.  Because  the  financial  products  were tailored  so closely
to  local  circumstances,  when  the  program  expanded,  it  was  able  to  maintain  very  high
portfolio quality.  Specifically,  the urban  and  rural microfinance  programs  employed separate
methodologies.
The  rural  methodology  used  group-based  lending  and  was dependent  on ownership
and  management  at  the  village  level.  Village  Credit  Funds  (VCFs)-revolving  fund
accounts-were  managed  by elected  Village  Credit  Committees  (VCCs),  of which  an ADF
representative  was an ex-officio  member. The VCC themselves decided on credit allocations,
defined  collateral,  and  controlled  the  repayment  of  loans.  ADF  credit  officers  provided
intensive  support to VCCs and information and advice to clients.
The  urban  methodology  was developed  beginning  in  1994  under  a pre-pilot  project
operating  in  three  cities:  Tirana,  Shijak,  and  Shkoder.  It  was  based  on  individual  lending,
secured  by character  assessment, evaluation of client's business, and close monitoring  by the
loan officer.
Plhase 11 (1995-1999):  Expansion
In  1995,  after  three  years  of  microfinance  experience,  the  ADF  substantially
expanded  its  microfinance  programs.  It  supported  rural  microfinance  under  the  Rural
Development  Project and  urban  microfinarice  under  the  Urban  Works  and  Microenterprise
Pilot  Project.  Under these  projects,  the  ADF became  the  only true provider  of microfinance
services  in the country beyond the informal sector.4
With this expansion,  the microfinance  sector  entered the  next  stage of development.
The ADF placed a greater emphasis  on financial  sustainability  of the program.  The  project's
orientation  shifted  from disbursement  to developing a credit system that would be financially
sustainable  and  provide  microentrepreneurs  with  access  to  credit  in  the  long  run.  The  ADF
began  to  closely  monitor  sustainability  and  identify  operational  and  social  intermediation
costs of its credit departments.
Legerwood.  p.  10.
13P/ase  111 (1999-Present):  Exitfrom tlhe Social Fund
By  1998,  ADF's three  main  programs-infrastructure,  rural  microcredit,  and  urban
microcredit-were  well-developed.  Each required  its own  institution  to  further  expand  and
reach  its  f'ull  potential.  Although  the  ADF  had  achieved  good  results  and  high  repayment
rates with its microfinance  programs,  both the rural  and urban programs required subsidies to
cover operational  costs.5 It  became  evident  that the  ADF  was not  providing the  appropriate
institutional  environment  for  the  development  of sustainable,  self-financing  credit delivery,
primarily  because  it lacked  hard budget constraints  and its management did not focus on cost
recovery.
As a  result,  in  1999,  staff embarked  on  the project's  most major  institutional  reform
task  to  date:  removing  the  microfinance  program  from  the  ADF.  The  ADFs  microfinance
programs  were  spun  off  into  two  separate  institutions.  The  rural  credit  program  was
transferred  to a new, quasi-governmental  Rural  Finance Fund.  The urban credit program  was
transferred  to the  Besa  Foundation,  a new  private  microfinance  foundation  established  with
the  assistance  of  the  Open  Society  Institute.  Both  programs  are  now  supported  by  the
Microcredit  Project.
Achievements
The  rural  and  urban  microfinance  programs continue  to  make  strong progress  under
the Microcredit  Project.
*  Rural Credit:  Twenty-one  Savings  and  Credit  Associations  (SCAs)  have  been
created  so  far  under  the  Rural  Finance  Fund.  Meanwhile,  the  overall  Village
Credit Fund portfolio  continues to perform at a high  level.  As of December  2000,
there  were  156  VCFs  in  five  districts  with  more  than  4,400  active  loans
amounting  to  $US2.6  million  and  only  3.46  percent  portfolio  at  risk  (over  60
days).'
*  Urbani  Credit: As of December 2000, the Besa Foundation's urban credit program
had  more than  2,600 outstanding  loans  totaling  $US4.9  million and  a portfolio  at
risk of 2.1  percent.7
5PAD, Microcredit  Project, May 28,  1999, p. 3.
6 Albania  Microcredit  Project, Back to Office Report, April  10,  200 1.
Ibid.
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Following  are  some  constraints  created  by  the  ADF's  institutionlal  environment  that
limited  the growth and sustainability of the microfinance  program.
*  Soft  budget  mentality:  The  most  important  constraint  was  the  ADF's  weak
emphasis  on  cost  recovery.  The  ADF's  parallel  infrastructure  program  did  not
face  the  same  cost  recovery  issues  as  the  microfinance  program,  and  therefore
made it difficult for staff to introduce the financial  discipline  necessary to develop
a sustainable MFI.
*  Joint balance  sheets:  The  fact  that  the  accounting  and  balance  sheets  for  the
microfinance  and  infrastructure  components  were  joined  under  the  ADF  also
reduced  the  incentive to keep  tight  budget controls.  If the project  had  established
separate  balance  sheets originally,  it might have  been possible  to avoid this  issue,
but  the  ADF management  strongly  resisted  this change  once  the  program  was  in
operation.
*  Lack of an exit strategy:  The removal  of the  rural  and  urban  microfinance  units
from  the  ADF took  years  of negotiation  by  Bank  staff and  required  substantial
support  of microfinance  experts.  This  transition,  while  critical  in  moving  the
program  toward  institutional  sustainability,  proved to be one of the most difficult
to implement.  The government  had  developed  a strong  sense  of ownership  of the
program and was reluctant  to turn it over to private management.  The main lesson
is the need to build a clear exit strategy into the project design. If privatization had
been articulated  as a  goal at  the outset,  it might have  been  easier  to convince the
government  of its necessity.
Success  Factors
Following  are some factors that contributed to the  success of the project.
*  Staff training and commitment:  From  the  outset,  the  ADF  invested  heavily  in
training  the  staff  of  its  microfinance  unit.  This  proved  critical  to  the  project
success,  particularly  in  1997  when Albania began  spiraling  into dramatic political
and  economic  crisis.8 Banks  and  public  buildings  were  burned,  the  government
was forced to resign, and  stocks of arms were looted and seized by the population,
then turned against the authorities and businesses.
Under  these  conditions,  no  one  knew  whether  the  ADF's  rural  and  urban
microfinance  programs  would  survive,  much  less  continue  to  succeed.  Against  all  odds,  the
ADF  carried  on  its  work,  maintaining  high  loan  portfolio  quality.  The  ADF's  rural  credit
officers  continued  to travel  to  remote  villages  for loan  repayment  and disbursement-often
x legerwood, p. 3.
15risking their personal safety-in order to preserve  the integrity of the VCF system.  The urban
credit  officers  continued  to  collect  and  disburse  loans,  even  though  some  cities  lacked
functioning  banks.
*  Metlhodology tailored to local context: ADF's  use  of village  members  in  the
management  of VCFs in  its  rural  credit  program  resulted  in  a  level  of ownership
and  commitment  to  success  that  is  not  always  found  in  other  microfinance
organizations.'  ADF's  unusually  high  repayment  rate  is  evidence  of  this,  as
village  members  have  successfully  approved  and  monitored  loans  within  their,
communities  and assisted  borrowers  who have  run into  difficulties.  Furthermore,
the  insistence on full  loan repayment in order for others to receive loans ensures a
commitment  on the part of all village members.
*  Separation of microfinance and infrastructure programs: Part of the reason that
the  program  succeeded  in  the  social  fund  environment  was  because  it separated
itself  to  a  large  degree  from  the  infrastructure  program.  The  ADF  made  a
deliberate  effort  to  provide  microcredit  in  communities  where  infrastructure
projects  had  not  taken  place,  and  vice  versa.  While  this  had  the  advantage  of
minimizing  confusion  between  grants  and  loans,  it  prevented  synergies  between
the sectors.
*  Consistent  donor support and assistance:  The World Bank's  support of ADF has
been  consistent since  its inception.'" The Bank's task manager was instrumental  in
setting  up  ADF  and  comanaged  the  project throughout  the  first two  phases.  The
continuity provided through frequent field visits and close supervision  has led to a
good relationship between  ADF staff and its donors.
Lessons Learned
While  the  ADF  provided  the  institutional  backing  to  develop  and  test  the
methodology  in  both urban  and  rural  areas,  it  did not  provide  the  institutional  environment
conducive  to  fiscal discipline or sustainability  of a microfinance  program.  The main  lessons
learned  are:
*  The credit delivery  mechanisms have to be based on local context and tradition.
*  Community-based  microfinance  can overcome  rural  finance  systemic  weaknesses
and withstand political and civil crises.
*  Early  emphasis  should  be placed  on  financial  sustainability  and the  institutional
environment.
9  Legerwood, p. 22.
Legerwood,  p. 22
Community-Driven  Development  in ECA:  Experience with  Microcredit, BBL,  April  10,  2001.
16*  Microfinance  programs  should  establish a clear exit strategy  from the social  fund
at the outset.
17IV.  Case Study:  Panama
Name  of project  Panama Social  Investment Fund
Date of appraisal  May 29,1997
Main  components  a) Infrastructure  (Social and Economic),  b)  Pilot
Projects  (school feeding,  social  services for
disadvantaged  groups, microenterprise),  c)
Project Management
Total project cost  $US80 million
Bank loan amount  $US28 million
Microfinance component  amount of  $US 5.3  million
Bank loan
Microfinance component as  7 percent
percentage of Bank loan
Introduction
In  1997,  the Government  of Panama  with support from the  World Bank  launched the
Social  Investment  Fund  Project.  The  objective  of the  project  is  to  alleviate  poverty  by
addressing the demands of the poor  for priority infrastructure  and services  and  by providing
support  for productive  activities.  The  project  includes  a $US5.3  million microfinance  pilot
program to channel  credit to microenterprises  through intermediary  organizations.
During the first two  years of implementation,  the microfinance  program faced  a series
of difficulties,  many  of which  derived  from the project's  focus on disbursement  rather than
institutional  sustainability  of MFIs.  Project  planners  did  not  take  into  account  many  of the
key  design  principles  that  characterize  the  new  generation  of microfinance  projects-those
that  focus  on institution  building, sustainability,  and outreach.  The  lack  of attention  to  such
principles  created  numerous  bureaucratic  obstacles  and  resulted  in  major  challenges  in
redesign.  As a result, no loans were disbursed  until the fourth year of the project.
Institutional Arrangements
The  Fondo  de  Inversion  Social  (FIS)'2 implements  all  subprojects  within  the  Social
Investment  Fund  Project.  The  staff from  the  small  microfinance  unit,  Direcci6n  de  Credito
para  Actividades  Productivas  (DCAP),  coordinates  the  microfinance  program,  selecting
12 Until  1999, the FIS was known as the  Fondo de  Emergencial  Social (FES).
18intermediary  organizations  and  providing support  for  training of staff and  other institutional
development  activities  in those organizations.
Project Design
Project  planners  anchored  the microfinance  component  within the  social  fund  largely
because  they  viewed  it  as  a  good  vehicle  for  disbursement  and  a  way  to  channel  funds
quickly to microbusinesses.  The decision was also influenced by the fact that Bank lending to
Panama  was relatively  limited,  and  while  a  financial  or  private  sector  development  project
might  have  been  a more  appropriate  vehicle  for microfinance,  no such  projects  were  in the
pipeline.  At the time,  the Bank  was also  wiclely supporting  microfinance  components  within
social  funds  in  other  countries  in  the  region,  as  well  as  in  Africa  and  South  Asia.  The
Honduras  Social  Fund  model,  which  included  microfinance  as  a second-tier  operation,  also
heavily  influenced  project design.
Many of the problems with the project resulted from its original design.  At the outset,
project  planners  believed  that the  FIS  offered  simple  institutional  arrangements  (the social
fund  channels  resources  to  several  existing  and  sound  MFIs,  which  would  onlend  to  the
target  group)  and,  therefore,  did  not  adequately  assess  the  menu  of institutional  options
available  to  them.  The  apex  model  that  was  chosen  was  in  fact just  one  of four  options
available  in  Latin America  to  support  microfinance  operations.  Other options included  (i) a
federation,  (ii)  an  association  of MFIs,  and  (iii)  a private  foundation.  Although  the  social
fund was probably  the easiest  vehicle to set up at the beginning, experience  has shown  it was
not  the  most effective.  In  addition,  a  social  fund  as  a  second-tier  operation  assumes  that a
iarge  number of eligible  MFIs  will  be  read)  for portfolio  expansion.  That number  of MFIs,
however, was at the time and  remains small  in Panama today.
The other models  offered several advantages.  First, since the other models were not in
the  political  mainstream  like  the  social  fund,  they might  have  been  less likely  to  fall  apart
with political  campaigns  and the aftermaths of elections.  Second,  they probably  would have
been able  to pay higher  wages  and attract more professional,  less political staff with relevant
business experience.  Third,  a private association, because  of its membership  base, might have
been  able  to represent  the industry better  in a policy  dialogue or respond more  effectively  to
the technical  assistance needs of MFIs.
19Problems and Constraints
Emphasis on Infrastructure
The  social  fund's  overwhelming  emphasis  on infrastructure  projects  created  a  series
of  problems  for  the  microfinance  program.  Neither  Bank  nor  government  staff devoted
adequate  attention  to the  issues specific  to the microfinance  sector at the outset, and expected
the  microfinance  component  to  be  implemented  largely  in  the  same  manner  as  the  other
subcomponents.  This  lack  of  attention  to  the  requirements  of a  microfinance  program  is
reflected  in the  fact that the  project preparation  team did  not include  a microfinance  expert.
As a result, it was not able to build  in many of the recent lessons and  best practices  that have
emerged  in  other  parts  of  the  globe.  It  was  not  until  December  1998,  when  the  Bank
recognized  it.  could  not  manage  this  component  without  special  assistance,  that  a
microfinance  expert became part of the Bank team.
Focus on Disbursement Ratiher titan Sustainability
While the program did not subsidize  interest  rates, its other design features  resembled
the  previous  generation  of microfinance  projects.  Much  like  infrastructure  projects  of the
1980s,  these microfinance  projects  focused  primarily  on disbursement  and reaching  a target
number  of  "beneficiaries,"  rather  than  the  sustainability  of the  MFIs  and  building  credit
histories  for  "clients."  This  bias  left  huge  gaps  in  detail,  especially  on  the  training  and
capacity-building  side.  There  were  no  plans  to  strengthen  the  systems  and  operations  of
financial  intermediaries,  so  that  they  could  serve  an  increasing  number  of  low-income
microenterprises  efficiently  and  soundly.  In addition,  the  project  measured  success  in terms
of number of loans and, therefore,  did  not set up any processes to monitor the improvements
in  the  institutional  capacity  of partner  institutions.  The  FIS  originally  required  no  reports
from  partner  institutions,  no  monthly  statistics,  and  no  monitoring  of staff development  or
system improvements.
Vague Operational Details
The project appraisal  document contained  fewer than two pages of details  on how the
component  would  operate.  While this  lack of detail  had the  advantage of providing  a degree
of freedom  to the  financial  intermediaries  to innovate and  develop their own methodologies,
20products,  and  services,  it  caused  many  difliculties  and  delays  during  the  first  two  years  of
implementation  and required serious efforts  to correct.
Political  Issues
The  location  of the  microfinance  program  within  the  social  fund  has  made  the
program  vulnerable  to  political  interference.  For  example,  the  change  in  government
following the elections  in December  1999  in Panama resulted  in almost a complete change  in
personnel  in  the  microfinance  unit,  DCAP,  and  severely  disrupted  progress.  More
importantly,  disagreements  slowed down the government approval process and disbursement,
ultimately  costing  the  microfinance  program  some  of  its  credibility  with  key  actors.
Bureaucratic  obstacles  in  combination  with  design  issues  meant  that  the  program  did  not
disburse any loans for the first three years.
Implementation Experience
In  early  1999,  the  DCAP  team  made  the  tough  decision  to  redesign  many  of the
project's central  features.  Some of the main issues requiring attention  are described below.
Selection of Partner Financial Intermediaries
The  original  project  design  set  forth  no  criteria  for  selecting  partner  organizations
other  than  that  the  FIS  would  lend  to  two  types  of financial  institutions:  "established"
intermediary  organizations  and  "emerging"  ones.  As  a  result,  the  staff evaluated  loans  to
financial  institutions  in  the  same  way  they  evaluated  infrastructure  subprojects.  They
developed  a point  system  to classify  the partner  as a  category  'A'  institution  (80  to  100),  'B'
(65 to 80),  or 'C' (below 65). The number of points set the range of potential  borrowing from
the FIS.
The system  suffered from several weaknesses:  It was (i) subjective, (ii)  not based on a
detailed  technical  review  of time  series  financial  statements,  and  (iii)  not  uniform  across
institutions.  Past financial  performance  and  systems  made  up  only  35 percent  of the  score,
yet  these  were  decisive  for  achieving  both  the  scale  and  sustainability  objectives  and
assuming  the  soundness  of the  partners.  T  he  definitions  were  applied  inconsistently,  and
some numbers were clearly not linked to the financial  statements.  No adjustments were  made
to the financial  statements to recognize  the effects  of in-kind  and other subsidies  and grants,
21making comparisons  impossible  and  the analysis  much  less  valuable.  Most  importantly,  the
selection  process  did  not  lead  to  recommendations  to  the  partners  on  ways  that  they  could
improve  management  systems,  products,  and  services  to increase  efficiency  and  reach  more
low-income  microenterprises.
In  December  1998,  a project supervision  mission recommended  that the project  take
several  steps  to improve  the  selection  of MFIs  and  streamline  the appraisal  process.  First,  it
recommended  that  when  evaluating  partner  institutions,  staff should  use  the  financial  and
poverty  indicators  developed  by  the  Consultative  Group  to  Assist  the  Poorest  (CGAP).
Second, it recommended  that Portfolio At Risk (PAR) of 30 days be used as the measurement
across  institutions,  since  this  is  becoming  the  standard  for the  microfinance  industry  (PAR
shows the  real  risk of the portfolio  by comparing  outstanding  loan  balances for loans with  at
least  one  late  payment  to  the  outstanding  loan  portfolio.)  Third,  the  point  system  was
adjusted  to measure  the  maturity and  efficiency  of financial  systems  such as internal  audits,
external  audits,  a  write-off  policy,  reserves  for  bad  debts,  and  delinquency  tracking  and
treatment.  Unfortunately,  many of these  changes  were  done away  with  several  months  later
when, as a result of changes  after the national  election,  the entire team was  let go by the  FIS,
leaving  little documentation  on changes in the process.
Institutional  Development Plans
The program's focus on disbursement  meant that at the outset the FIS had  no strategy
for helping  partner organizations  to  improve their operations  or build capacity  of their  staff.
Thus,  the  project introduced  the concept  of institutional development plans for each  partner
institution,  with  the  goal  of  improving  the  long-term  sustainability  of the  microfinance
industry  in  Panama.  FIS  staff now  work with  each  potential  partner  institution  to  develop  a
plan  tailored  to  the  institution's  needs.  This  brief  plan  includes  (i)  the  institution's
development  objectives,  (ii)  the  identification  of  its  operational  weaknesses,  and  (iii)  a
specific  plan  of technical  assistance,  training  events,  and  other  types  of support  (such  as
consultancies)  proposed  by  the  MFI  and  technically  verified  by  the  DCAP  FIS  team  to
overcome  each  major weakness.
22Contracting Procedures
Some  of  the  Bank's  internal  contracting  procedures  also  created  barriers  to
implementation of the program.  For example,  at the outset,  the Bank  required  a no objection
to all  packages  of subloans  from, the Bank  task team  leader  (TTL).  This meant that the TTL
had to review  a 1  2-page document  for each subloan to  a borrower-a  requirement  developed
for  infrastructure  subloans  in  the  parallel  FIS  programs,  but  totally  inappropriate  for  a
microfinance  program  attempting  to streamline  approval  processes.  This  issue  was  resolved
administratively  by the  Bank after lengthy discussions.
Lessons  Learned
An examination  of the experience  in  Panama with the  FIS confirms  that social  funds
can  be  risky  vehicles  for  microfinance  if  they  do  not  contain  adequate  measures  for
institution building at the outset and are not treated differently  from social fund  infrastructure
activities.  In particular:
*  A social  fund project  must take an industry-wide  view to be successful,  focusing
on the  institutional  building blocks  of participating  MFIs and  sectoral  issues,  not
just on reaching disbursement  goals.
*  Social  fund  projects  should  include  microfinance  experts  as  part  of the  project
preparation  team in order to ensure that industry best practices  are incorporated  in
project design.
*  Project  planners  should  explore  the  full  range  of  institutional  options  before
including a microfinance  project  as part of a social  fund.  This is  critical to ensure
that the social  fund is  positioned  to  support  the development  of the  microfinance
sector  in  the  country  and  that  it  adds  value  by  encouraging  existing  MFIs  to
expand  to  new  regions,  serve  new  types  of clients,  and  develop  new  financial
products for the target group.
23V.  Case Study: Yemen
Name  of project  Second Social  Fund for Development  Project
Date of appraisal  April  11,  2000
Main components  a) Community  Development,  b) Microfinance
and Income Generation,  c)  Capacity Building
Total project cost  $US 175  million
Bank loan amount  $US75 million
Microfinance  component  $US5 million
Microfinance  component as  6.7 percent
percentage of Bank financing
Introduction
Since  1996,  the  Yemen  Social  Fund  for  Development  (SFD)  has  served  as  an
important  vehicle  for  developing  and  testing  approaches  to  microfinance  tailored  to  local
circumstances.  It  is  the  first  microfinance  program  in  the  region  to  create  and  expand  a
lending  program  based  on  Islamic  banking  practices.  While  the main  challenge  of the  first
phase  of development  was  to  establish  microfinance  institutions  where  none  existed,  the
challenge of the second phase  is to build the capacity of those institutions  to provide  services
on a sustainable basis.
Institutional Arrangements
The  SFD was established  in September  1997  as an autonomous  agency with financial
and  administrative  independence  from  the  government.  A  Small  and  Micro-Enterprise
Development  Unit  is  responsible  for  administering  the  SFD  microfinance  and  income-
generating  programs through  eligible intermediaries.  This  unit  was separated  from the  other
units administering  the social fund subprojects.
The  unit's  main  task  is  to  provide  technical  and  financial  support  to  intermediaries
using  clear  and  transparent  guidelines.  Continued  support  depends  upon  intermediaries
meeting performance  standards.
Achievements
The  provision  of  credit  to  small  and  microentrepreneurs  is  a  relatively  new
phenomenon  in  Yemen.  Until  the  SFD launched  a microfinance  pilot project,  there were  no
institutions  that  provided  microfinance  services  to  the  poor.  Now  in  its  second  phase,  the
24SFD  has  grown  to  support  three  microfinance  programs  and  four  income-generating
programs,  all supported  by extensive capacity-building  programs.
*  As of March  2001,  SFD had  3,993  outstanding  borrowers  and  60  savers,  with  a
total outstanding loan amount of $US729,449.''
*  Since its inception,  SFD  has supported  11,676  borrowers  and  1,500  savers, with a
cumulative  loan amount of $US2,913,629.'4
Implementation Experience
Piloting and Selecting Partner Institutions
At  the  time  of the  SFD  establishment,  Yemen  had  neither  the  experience  nor  the
institutional  capacity  to  deliver  financial  services  effectively  to the  poor.  The  World  Bank,
with assistance  from the  EU and  the Netherlands,  launched  pilot projects  in two regions:  the
urban slum areas of Hodeidah  city, and the remote areas of the Dhamar Governate.  The main
objectives  were  to  develop  local  capacity  to  build  and  manage  sustainable  microfinance
programs  and to test new delivery mechanisms in a variety of settings.
Selecting partner institutions  was considered one of the most difficult tasks, given  the
goal of identifying  partners with the potential  to operate financially  sustainable microfinance
programs.  For  example,  at  the  start  of the  project,  the  SFD  identified  10  local  NGOs  and
welfare  associations  in  Hodeidah  as  potential  partners.  All  had extremely  limited capacity.
The  Hodeidah  Women's  Union  (HWU)  was  determined  to  be the  most  suitable partner  for
several  reasons.  First,  it  had  experience  in  providing  a  range  of  "traditional"  women's
services  such  as literacy  classes  and  outreach  services.  It  also had  an  active  and  committed
board and a large network of potential  clients, both  male and female.  The Hodeidah program
now operates the largest microfinance  program, with 2,072 active borrowers.
The  experimentation  done  under  the  pilots  has  proved  critical  to  the  success  of the
project.  The pilots explored  models  for urban and  rural areas  as well as group  and individual
lending  methodologies  that  were  later  replicated  and  expanded.  In  addition,  the  pilot
established  a few microfinance  intermediaries that formed the backbone of the project.
Funds disbursed in YR, Aide  Memoire,  May 2001, p. 2.
1  Funds disbursed in YR. ibid.
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One of the main  achievements  of the program during  its  first phase  was to  develop  a
microfinance  methodology  closely  tailored  to  local  circumstances  and  based  on  Islamic
banking  principles  such  as  Mudaraba,  Murabaha,  and Musharaka.  Islamic  banking  practices
do  not use  interest  rates explicitly  because  of the  strong  religious  and  cultural  resistance  to
them, but instead use  fees or profit sharing.
The  methodology  used  under  the  SFD  includes  effective  interest  rates  based  on  fees
or  profit  shares  that  are  high  enough  to  make  the  program  financially  sustainable.  For
example,  in programs  that offer  livestock  lending,  the  participating  microfinance  institution
backs  the  intermediary  by taking a  share of the  sale  as price of repayments.  This  allowed  a
relatively  high  rate  of  effective  interest  (40  percent,  less  10  percent  inflation)  without
generating public comment or criticism.
Capacity-Building  Requirements
The experience  in Yemen has demonstrated  that the  SFD is capable of building MFIs
with  the  potential  for  sustainability,  but  the  institutions  require  intensive  support  from  the
outset.  For  example,  the  most successful  microfinance  program,  operated  by  the  Hodeidah
Women's Union,  was  established  as one of the original  pilot projects. Although  the program
has  reached  operational  sustainability,  it  continues  to  face major  capacity-building  issues  in
order  to  become  institutionally  and  financially  sustainable.  Some  of the  difficulties  arose
because  the  microfinance  department  was  separated  to  a  great  extent  from  HWU's  other
programs.  It operated separate  bank accounts, had specialized  staff training, and implemented
its own  salary  structure.  Project planners  viewed  such  autonomy  as critical  to the program's
success  at  the  outset; however,  the  result was that  the program's  board of directors  was not
involved  in  the  program  implementation  enough  to  manage  it  without  continuing  support
from the  SFD.'5
Staff Training
The  lack  of qualified  staff in  Yemen  has  been  identified  as a  primary  constraint  to
expansion  of the  program."  This  issue  has  been  and  continues  to  be  addressed  in  several
1 Hodeidah  Microfinance  Program TORs.  p. 2.
-Mid-term  review,  p  10
26ways  including  (i)  through  intensive  training  and  TA  for  the  microfinance  unit  staff  by
international  microfinance  consultants,  (ii)  through  participation  of key  staff members  in
training  programs  internationally  (for  example,  in  Boulder,  Colorado)  and  regionally,  and
(iii)  by  developing  annual  training  plans.  New  plans  intend  to  pair a regional  MFI  with  the
SFD to support  a new program  with an Islamic bank in Yemen.
Microfinance vs. Income-Generating  Programs
The  SFD  operates  both  microfinance  programs  and  income-generating  programs
(IGPs). Microfinance  programs  offer credit and  savings services.  IGPs offer loans to help the
poor develop  income-generating  activities,  such  as beekeeping  and  cattle-raising.  IGPs  have
been  established  in  areas  where  existing  demand  for microfinance  services  was  high,  but
where  the  client  base  was  insufficient  to justify  large  technical  and  financial  investments
required to establish an MFI.
Experience  from the field  reveals important  differences  in  results  between  the two  in
terms of outreach and sustainability.  Specifically:
*  IGPs do not result in large  benefits that can always justify the costs involved.  The
average  number  of clients  for  a  typical  IGP  is  much  less  than  for  microfinance
programs.
*  With  the  great  majority of their portfolios  concentrated  in  one  activity,  IGPs  are
more risky than microfinance  programs.
*  Problems  associated  with  intermediaries  continue  to  be  the  major hurdle  for this
component-generally  a major capacity  issue hinders working with NGOs,  while
work with the relatively stronger co-ops  is hindered by lack of incentives for these
profit-oriented  institutions.
Based on  this experience,  the SFD will  be focusing on developing  more microfinance
programs  than  IGPs  in  the  future.  When  IGPs  are developed,  thorough  efforts  will  be made
from the design phase to diversify their portfolios.'7
Catastrophic  Insurance:  Responding to a Nationwide Crisis
In  2000  Yemen  was  hit  by  Rift  Valley  Fever  and  foot  and  mouth  epidemics.  The
disaster claimed the lives of more than 50 people and thousands of cattle and sheep and had  a
' This  mainly  entails  longer  support  to operational  cost  of programs  to allow  co-ops  to  have  some  financial
benefits from  income revenues  from interest  or murahaha  income during the  initial stages.  In  addition,  the SFD
Board  has decided  to allow the  intermediaries  to keep  50 percent  of the  net profits after the program  reaches a
matture  state.
27very  strong  negative  impact  on the  portfolio  of some  of the  SFD's microfinance  and  IGPs.
The problems  resulted  from  the  loss  of sheep  and  cattle  by program  clients,  the  severe  drop
in  the  price  of meat,  and  moratoriums  on  the  transport  of animals  in  infected  areas.  Many
programs  very  quickly  depleted  their  insurance  fund  resources  and  faced  rapidly
deteriorating portfolios.
The SFD played  an  important role during this nationwide crisis  by reducing risk to  its
borrowers  and moved  quickly to top the  insurance  funds of participating  MFIs.  It also agreed
to support  affected  programs  by  writing off outstanding  loans  of clients  who  had  losses  of
animals,  or  supporting  the  insurance  funds  of those programs  that  had  them.  Although  the
crisis  was  initially  handled  with  the  intermediaries  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  measures  are
being implemented  to formalize the insurance  program  in the future,  follow  international  best
practices,  and  ensure  equity  among  programs.  The  SFD's  contracts  with  MFIs  in the future
will  be revised to include  a formal catastrophic  insurance clause.
Lessons  Learned
Piloting the Methlodology
One  of the  project's  main  achievements  has  been  to  develop  a  highly  innovative
lending  methodology  tailored  to  local  circumstances.  This  was  done  primarily  during  the
pilot stage,  when the SFD explored a range of socially-adapted  mechanisms,  including urban
programs,  rural  programs,  programs  for women,  savings  programs,  and programs  based  on
Islamic banking  practices.
Demandfor a range offinancial services
The  microfinance  program  in  Yemen  was  conceived  purely  as  a  microfinance
program.  However,  experience  showed  that  poor  clients  demand  a  range  of  financial
products,  including  savings.  The SFD  now supports  two  programs  to encourage  savings  by
poor women-one  rural  and one urban.
Capacity Building
Although  the  SFD  focused  on  creating  sustainable  MFIs  from  the  outset,  capacity
building  remains  the  main  implementation  challenge.  All  of the programs  continue  to need
substantial  staff  training  and  development  to  improve  efficiency  of their  operations.  To
28support  this  effort,  the  program  has  developed  an  improved  operational  manual  based  on
international  best  practice  standards.  The  program  is  also  continuing  to  invest  significant
resources  in training  the  microfinance  unit staff so they can effectively  develop  and monitor
the performance  of partner  institutions.
29VI.  Case  Study: Eritrea
Name of project  Eritrea Community Development  Fund Project
Date of appraisal  January  30,  1996
Main components  a)  Social and Economic  Infrastructure  and
Services, b) Pilot Savings and Credit, c)  Capacity
Building, Training  and Research
Total project cost  $US 49.68 million
Bank loan amount  $US17.5  million
Microfinance  component  $US3.11  million
Microfinance  component  as  6 percent
percentage of total financing
Introduction
Established  in  1996,  the Eritrea  Community  Development  Fund (ECDF)  was  the first
program  to provide  microfinance  services  to  the  poor  in  Eritrea  following  30  years  of war.
The  program  emerged  in  response  to  Eritrea's  devastated  economy.  Enterprises  were  not
operational,  the  agricultural  sector  was  destroyed,  and  basic  social  service  facilities  had
suffered  from  serious  damage  and  neglect.  The disruption  of family  life resulting from  war,
displacement,  and drought  also  left thousands of citizens impoverished.
From  the  start,  the  government  has  viewed  the  ECDF's microfinance  program  as  a
first  step  toward  developing  and  diversifying  the  financial  sector.  The  program  is designed
not only  to provide  financial  services  to the  poorest and  most vulnerable  groups,  but also to
encourage  the  development  of  sustainable  microfinance  institutions,  particularly  in  rural
areas.  This  long-term  approach  and  focus  on  institutional  development  has  influenced  the
project throughout  implementation  and contributed  to its early achievements.
Institutional Arrangements
ECDF is  a semi-autonomous  unit operating  under the Ministry of Local Government.
It was launched  in April  1993  as part of the Recovery and  Rehabilitation  Program for Eritrea.
A central  Savings and  Credit Program (SCP)  unit implements the microfinance  program.  The
unit  provides  overall  guidance  for  the  program,  carries out  program-wide  activities  such  as
monitoring, and  selects and  trains field staff.
30Village  Administration  Committees  (VACs)  handle  credit decisions  and  lending  at
the  community  level.  VACs  are  democratically  elected  institutions,  responsible  for
promoting  the  program  within  the  community,  orienting  "solidarity  groups"  of borrowers,
keeping records on savings and loans, and handling arrears.
The  ECDF offers  both  savings  and  credit through  two  types of loans.  Tier  I clients
may borrow up to $US 1,000  per group,  and Tier  11  clients  up to $USI 0.000.  Groups become
eligible for loans only after having successfully accumulated  savings  for up to three months.
Achievements
The outstanding  portfolio  currently  stands at approximately  $US1.4  million,  with  87
village  banks  operating  in  the  country.'8 Portfolio  quality  has  been  high,  with  0  percent
arrears  in  1996,  1.15  percent  in  1997,  2.04  percent  inI998,  7.12  percent  in  1999,  and  5.96
percent  in  December  2000.  Delinquency  increased  during  1999  and  2000 as a  result of the
conflict with Ethiopia.
Individual  voluntary  and  open  access savings  accounts  have  proved  most successful
in  attracting  savers.  Though  the  microfinance  program  has  been  experimenting  with
compulsory  locked-in  savings  or  group  accounts,  these  services  have  produced  lower
outreach  and slower growth of the deposit base than voluntary deposits.
Project Design:  Phasing Approach
While  the  microfinance  program  demonstrated  immediate  success  in  reaching  the
target group  with financial  services,  its location  as part of the social  fund  is  accompanied by
significant  risks.  In  particular,  since  the  program  follows  the "revolving  fund"  approach,  in
which  funds are lent to village groups and repaid  to the social fund, the ECDF  is involved in
direct  finance.  This  is  a  critical  issue,  because  it  is  generally  recognized  that  donor  or
government  funding will  not be large  or permanent  enough to assure the continuing delivery
of microfinance  services  to the  millions of poor or near-poor who need  them."' Microfinance
programs  can achieve  massive  outreach only  if they are able to tap into commercial  sources
of funding, including the deposits of the public.
"  ECDF.  SCP Evaluation,  p. 9.
1 Levy. Fred  D.  Apex  Institutions in Microfinance, draft,  May  1,  2001. p. 2.
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microfinance  sector  and  adopting  a  phased  approach.  Although  the  microfinance  program
was originally anchored  withinl the  ECDF, this arrangement has been  viewed  from the start as
appropriate  only for the  first phase of development  of the sector.  From  the outset,  the project
staff have  worked  with the  understanding  that  the project's  main goal  is to build  institutions
that  will  provide  the  microentrepreneurs  in  Eritrea  with  a  range  of financial  services  on  a
sustainable  basis.
Under  the  Eritrea  Emergency  Reconstruction  Program,  which  has  recently  been
developed,  the  microfinance  component  will  be  spun  off to operate  independently  from  the
social  fund,  but still as a government  program  within the same ministry.  The third phase  will
focus on building a private  financial institution.
Constraints
While  the  ECDF has provided  a  valuable  vehicle  for jumpstarting  the  microfinance
sector  in  Eritrea,  it  also  created  a  set  of obstacles  during  project  implementation.  These
distortions  were  minimized  to  some  degree  by  the  government  commitment  to  the project.
but  still  affected  the  growth  and  development  of the  project.  Following  is  a  description  of
some of the problems the program encountered:
*  Interest  rate  rigidities:  One  of the  program's  most  difficult  problems  derived
from  interest  rate  caps  imposed  by  the  Ministry  of Finance.  As  a  result,  MFIs
were  unable  to  charge  the  required  rates  to  achieve  full  financial  sustainability.
The  result  has  been  that  the  program  is  covering  costs  but  not  financially
sustainable.  The  program  charged  16  percent  for Tier I clients  and  14 percent  for
Tier  1 'clients, which  was  relatively  higher  than other microlending  institutions  in
Eritrea.  However,  because  of inflation,  real  interest  rates  have  ranged  between
0.00 and +0.0 12 percent.20
*  Salary rigidities: Because the microfinance  program  was located  within the  social
fund,  the program  was  unable  to raise  salaries  to the  desired  level.  Salaries  were
capped  to  keep  in  line  with  salaries  of other  ECDF  staff.  As  a  result,  it  was
difficult  to retain  qualified and trained  staff members.
*  Incentive  structures for  loan  officers:  Along  the  same  lines  as  the  salary
rigidities, incentive  structures  for loan officers  were very difficult to push through
and were  only approved  in  2001.
20ECDF.  SCP Evaluation.  p-  10
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The  factors described  below have  contributed  to the success of ECDF's microfinance
program.
*  Staff  development:  The  microfinance  program  has  focused  heavily  on  staff
training and development  and, as a  result, has achieved  a very high  level  of staff
commitment.  This commitment proved critical to the sustainability of the program
itself when  fighting broke  out in  1999  along  the border with Ethiopia.  While  the
portfolio was temporarily  frozen,  the loans were not written off.  Staff continued to
monitor  the  outstanding  loans  and  recover  the  loans.throughout  the  conflict.
Although  loan  recovery  was  extremely  difficult  to  implement  at  the  time,  it
helped the program survive  a major nationwide  crisis.
*  Reliance  on  Microfinance  Specialists:  The  program  relied  heavily  on
microfinance  specialists  not  only  during  project  design,  but  also  to  provide
technical  assistance  and  training  as  the  program  progressed.  This  has  been
considered  a key factor in developing  the necessary capacity of program  staff and
ensuring  that the program  benefits  from internationally-recognized  best practices
in the sector.
*  Managerial Autonomy:  Government  commitment  to  the  program  allowed  the
microfinance  program  a  critical  degree  of managerial  autonomy.  Although  the
program  was  located  within  ECDF,  the  SCP  unit staff was managed  separately,
with a clear  division  of responsibility.  Political  interference  was  further  reduced
by the fact that lending decisions  were made at the village level.
*  Piloting Methiodology  and New Product Development:  The ECDF developed and
tested  its  methodology  during  the  Pilot  Savings  and  Credit  Program.  Key
elements  were  flexible  loan  terms,  strong social  pressure  through  the "solidarity
group"  lending,  and  incentives  of higher  loans  for  repeat  clients.  The  ECDF
continues  to refine the methodology  and develop  new products, such  as the Tier 11
loan, which allows higher amounts for small enterprises.
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